The long farewell: Peugeot's departure from the U.S. market
Source: Business Horizons, May-June, 1995 by Jean-Loup Archawski, Francis W. Wolek
The Peugeot is a French car that "reverently coddles" its owner in a feeling of secure comfort. At its peak in the United States, Peugeot annually sold 20,000 automobiles and gained a following among individuals willing to give the car what one owner called "lots of loving and acceptance of its aggravations." Nevertheless, despite such loyalty, annual sales sank to fewer than 5,000 and the company ultimately abandoned the U.S. market.
The story is an old one that is forever new in its variations. American auto lovers liked the car and wanted to be wooed. The French suitor, however, simply pitched them the same line as in France and gave all its attention to the allures of the American automobile industry. Mass production, full lines, and productivity advances through engineering were all the rage and Peugeot fell for it all.
Not surprisingly, many American customers still yearn for that feeling, and Peugeot recognizes that no company worth its salt can make it if it fails in the world's largest market. Jilted customers will give the company another chance. Once it might have taken only a small touch here and a caring courtesy there. Now, like all wooers of customer loyalty, Peugeot has to prove a commitment to a lasting relationship with the American customer.
A central message of modern times is that no nation or people exists in isolation. Prominent or obscure, history teaches that we are all interdependent. History has also taught us that large corporations are major participants in the networks that link people around the world. Corporate decisions strongly affect the quality of our shared environments, the interaction of people across international boundaries, and beliefs about the reliability and behavior of nations as partners.
In short, we must understand the behavior of corporations to maximize the growing benefits of our global relationships. When a highly visible corporation withdraws from the growing web of global interdependency, as Peugeot recently did from the U.S. market, we have an important opportunity for learning.
PEUGEOT IN AMERICA
Peugeot sold automobiles in the United States from 1958 until its formal withdrawal in the summer of 1991. Starting in the late 1970s, sales grew and reached a peak in the mid-1980s, when the sharp increase in oil prices sparked consumer interest in Peugeot's diesel-powered autos (see the Figure).
Typically, Peugeots appealed to middle- and upper-class consumers who appreciated European engineering and handling. The Peugeot 505 SW8 Turbo, for example, was attractive for its eight-passenger capacity, peppy engine, and Peugeot's traditional comfort. One owner expressed his regard for Peugeot autos by stating that he felt "at one with the car; it's almost an extension of myself."
The positive history of Peugeot in the U.S. and Europe eliminates one explanation for its eventual withdrawal: This was not a weak company. During much of the 1970s, for example, Peugeot was the largest automobile company in Europe.
Some experts on international markets claim that how a firm organizes its entry into a foreign market strongly influences its performance in that market. They contrast a strategic approach with reactive management that takes whatever action is necessary to obtain immediate sales. A strategic approach to a market is characterized by systematic selection of target markets, commitment of resources for a permanent position, development of products specifically designed for the targeted market, control of channels of distribution, and aggressive use of advertising and promotion. To what extent did Peugeot's approach to the U.S. market show such attributes?
Instead of being strategically driven, the company's entry into the American market was a result of pressure from the French government. The government wanted Peugeot to export to a market that would bring hard currency back to France and even insisted that Peugeot distribute its cars through the dealer system of Renault, a government-owned company. This pressure was welcomed by some executives who were building a network for global exports, starting with France's former colonies. But although the vision of building an automotive power of global dimensions had been important from the beginning for Peugeot, such a vision was evidently not behind opening the American entry. Indeed, Maurice Jordan, the operating head of Peugeot until 1965, was described as: ... very conservative about investment and expansion, [and he believed] exports unprofitable for the firm. As he viewed the matter, their value was primarily to keep the home factories busy and bring greater economies of scale .... [R]ather than concentrating on a few [countries], as VW did in Brazil and the United States, Jordan wanted to spend as little as possible on exports. (Laux 1992)
At the beginning, Peugeot had no long-range strategy for the American market and no resources to do more than distribute the cars its factory was already producing. At best, the company was betting that American sales would provide the resources and exposure needed for a strategy to emerge out of involvement with American allies and customers.
AN ATTRACTIVE PRODUCT: REQUISITE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF STRATEGY
The emergence of a successful strategy from actual experience required Peugeot to offer attractive cars to American consumers. A respectable product would be the base for adaptations with features important to Americans.
Quality of Peugeot's Cars
America's reaction to Peugeot cars is reflected in its automotive press. In 1971, the model 304 placed second in Motor Trend magazine's "Car of the Year" competition. Peugeot's model 604 also received rave reviews in the mid-1970s. Road and Track subtitled its review: "C'est confortable, c'est formidable, c'est magnifique." Motor Trend compared the 604 with a Mercedes:
The German car, as typified by Mercedes, is ferociously devoted to efficiency .... The French car, especially typified by Peugeot, reflects the Frenchman's concern with comfort, pleasure and utility... Where the German car sometimes imparts a feeling of coldness, the French car always gives at least an initial feeling of warmth... that your body is being reverently treated, even coddled.
Favorable reviews of Peugeot cars continued well into the 1980s with the introduction of what became the company's flagship model in the United States, the 505. For example, Car and Driver magazine noted in 1980:
The U.S., it seems, has been put on the low priority list; Peugeot wanted to strengthen its home country [position], branch out to the common market, and go after Africa, where its famed durability and reliability made it the unofficial car of third world countries. Now it's our turn, and for us Peugeot has built the 505 . . . [a] potent new offensive weapon.
The Consumer's Response
The American market is driven by consumers who are free to choose any car they wish and on whatever grounds they wish. Competitive cars (those recognized by Peugeot were the Maxima MB, Audi 5000, and Volvo SW) had led consumers to expect certain features in a quality automobile. Peugeots fulfilled these expectations in many areas: stylish design, positive press notices, sumptuous interior, and European engineering, However, though billed as "Total Luxury Cars," early Peugeots did not include other features standard to its class: air conditioning, power windows and seats, a sunroof, and familiar controls (Peugeot's controls were located per European custom).
The consumer's experience with reliability is a critical criterion of quality. On this point, a frequent reaction was expressed by a current owner as follows:
The cars are well engineered. The things that go wrong are usually minor but too frequent and a nuisance in that they don't stay fixed. The 505 is a great car, but flawed by minor problems that are so aggravating that I believe Peugeot's public image is one of unreliability.
The minutes of the Eastern Dealer's Council of November 14, 1979 note that, "PMA [Peugeot Motors of America] expressed grave concern that owner complaints about dealer service were presently running about 20 percent. An acceptable level was deemed to be 5 percent in urban areas, 2 percent in rural areas." Chronic, if relatively minor, problems characterized Peugeots in seals, cold-engine stalling, radios, temperature controls, and rust (in areas hit by hard winters).
Home Country Preoccupations Limit the International Strategy
Why didn't Peugeot recognize these weaknesses and redesign its cars and policies for U.S. conditions? One answer is that such modifications would have been expensive. Adding reliable, factory-built air conditioning required extensive rearrangement of the engine compartment; providing acceleration for high-speed passing would have meant tightening a suspension system central to the road handling treasured by French drivers.
A policy of adapting designs to American conditions was also a slippery slope in that considerably different design philosophies were perceived to underlie European and American regulations. Peugeot executives note that French safety standards rely on crash avoidance and stress road handling strengths such as fast turning. American regulations are seen as emphasizing crash absorption and stress a strong and relatively heavy passenger compartment. Peugeot planners estimated that the costs of redesigning some Peugeot models for U.S. standards would have run $90 million and could have compromised the company's competitive strengths in road handling. A perspective on management's willingness to incur such expense is that, in its peak year in America (1984), PMA sales represented only 2.8 percent of Peugeot sales in France and 1.3 percent of worldwide production.
Peugeot had not encountered complaints about quality completeness and customer service in France because, from the end of World War II to the 1970s, demand far outstripped supply. About the time that capacity caught up with demand in the late 1970s, Peugeot was focusing its resources on domestic issues such as integrating major acquisitions (first Citroen and then Chrysler Europe or Talbot) into what had become Europe's largest automobile company.
In summary, from the late 1950s until the mid 1970s, Peugeot missed a window of opportunity because it lacked the capacity and strategy to do more than offer models developed for the French market.(1) When capacity became available in the 1970s, the company's resources and management attention were focused on organizing for the European market. And so the next window of opportunity was missed, an opportunity to build on the fortuitous popularity of diesel cars during the petroleum price crisis. It was not until the late 1980s, when the 205 made the company a successful mass-market producer, that Peugeot had the resources to heed the demands of competition in the U.S. market. By that time, new competition in the form of upscale Japanese models and rejuvenated American models had closed the window of opportunity for Peugeot's fine but expensive and not exceptional automobiles
.
THE EMERGENCE OF STRATEGY WITH EXPERIENCE
Two requirements for a successful strategy in a foreign market are capability (competent talent and attractive product) and resources allocated to the new market. The success of Peugeot in Europe and the reception of its cars in the United States indicate that it had the capability. On the second point, European concerns dominated the allocation of resources and interfered with the formulation of a conscious strategy for the American market. Nevertheless, PMA executives were not passive. To what extent did their actions build a culture of cooperation with American allies and position the company to respond when resources would become available?
Dealer-Headquarters Relationships
An automobile company's dealers are critical allies because they buy the cars from the manufacturer, interact directly with owners in sales and service, and maintain cars over their life span. A system for feedback from dealers was started in the mid-1970s when a Peugeot Dealers Council was organized.
The minutes of the dealers council meetings throughout the 1970s indicate agreement with positioning the car as an affordable, total luxury automobile. However, dealers expressed serious concern that Peugeot was not following through on this positioning, especially in its failure to adapt products and practices to U.S. expectations in the luxury market. The council passed the following resolution in December 1979 demanding that Paris make a commitment to the U.S. market:
Council wishes to point out to Automobile Peugeot that the U.S. market... is the most competitive in the world. Any major automotive manufacturer who is unable to successfully merchandise his product in the U.S. market today must be deemed to have an inferior product and organization. The Council has extreme concern over what it perceives to be a 'not give a damn' attitude on the part of . . . those in France responsible for the success of the U.S. market .... Put in simple terms, the Council recommends that Peugeot either get totally involved in the U.S. market or get out altogether.
The resolution received no response.
From entry until the 1980s, Peugeot executives in the U.S. did not build a culture of cooperation with American allies. After the mid-1980s, funds became available for PMA executives to address the U.S. market's uniqueness with customer surveys, a U.S.-styled leasing policy, and a turbocharged engine specifically designed for the 505 wagon sold in the U.S. However, the company still lacked what one Peugeot executive describes as essential for overseas success: headquarters champions who translate market feedback and use it to fight for adaptations in corporate policy and auto designs.
The top management of Mercedes, for example, believed that the U.S. market was critical to its success from the earliest days of the company. One reason Peugeot had no American champions was that every executive sent from France either entered a new business in the U.S. or left the company on returning to Europe. This pattern was so striking that an assignment to the U.S. was taken by Peugeot's best and brightest as a prelude to a career eclipse.
The Influence of America's Automotive Culture
Adaptation to foreign markets evolves in more subtle ways than strategy formulation and champion advocacy. Once Peugeot entered the United States, it was influenced by the culture of the U.S. auto industry whether it knew it or not. The American automobile culture is typified by its big three U.S. companies and is built around the idea of mass production. The culture assumes basic comparability between marques and emphasizes marketing a full line (small economy cars to luxury models) and high volume production. The point is to achieve as high a visibility and as low a cost as possible through high volume and economies of scale.
PMA's commitment to this high-volume, full-line approach is evident in its policies of building as large a distribution network as possible so that it would reach a critical mass for brand recognition. One of PMA's presidents had the goal of a dealer network comparable in size to Volvo's, a company with five times Peugeot's sales. The following statements of Peugeot's president Jacques Calvet in 1990 also reflect a commitment to the culture of mass operations:
I'd be a complete fool if I didn't feel the impact of the new competition. I've been clear-minded about the problem for a long time. But... I think [lucidity] should lead to a strategic choice, and ours is to improve our group's production, its productivity and the quality of its products. (Resener 1990)
After the success of Peugeot's diesels, PMA began to develop an American approach to the market. However, sales dropped markedly and attention-winning success did not emerge to counter the mass-volume culture that dominated Peugeot in both Europe and the United States. For example, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, Peugeot was essentially a one-model company (the 505) in the United States. Why couldn't it have operated with a distribution and marketing system appropriate to this de facto niche position? One answer is that Peugeot had become a prominent player in an industry that was permeated with mass-volume thinking. The problem was that such thinking was an obstacle to strategically focusing on a target market with a specifically designed car and distribution system.
A STRATEGY FOR LONG-TERM CUSTOMER LOYALTY
What strategies did Peugeot try and with what success? The executives who led PMA were aware of the need for an American strategy. Indeed the themes that dominated the firm's advertising show that management tried several different strategies over the years.
Strategic Alternatives
The following themes characterized Peugeot advertising during the 1970s and 80s:
* 1971 to 1976--"Comfort'' advertisements stressing space, extensive testing, room, and plush seating.
* 1977--"Luxury Car Comparisons" stressing the engineering of a Mercedes, BMW, or Jaguar with greater comfort.
* 1981--"Upscale Sports" ties stressing association with tennis and skiing.
* 1983--"Slice of Life" advertisements associating Peugeot ownership with upscale life styles.
* 1984 to 1987--"Performance" advertisements stressing the engineering, comfort ("Nothing Else Feels Like It"), and power of the 505.
* 1989--"Family Safety" stressing the use safety of a 505 station wagon.
Peugeot's advertising shows a tension between promoting advantages of comfort and performance recognized in Europe and the image of a luxury car. From the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, Peugeot abandoned its identity as a maker of comfortable cars for one with luxury marques and the lifestyle of upscale socialites. New executives adopted the predominant approach to a marketing strategy in the U.S.: extolling the performance advantages of the 505. The clarity of Peugeot's identity as a maker of comfortable family cars was, however, diffused with its identity as a maker of powerful cars that won races.
Long-Term Customer Loyalty
Peugeot's experimentation with a performance strategy is intriguing because it runs counter to the strategy that had been successful in Europe. In France, and until its emergence as a mass marketer with the 205 in 1980, Peugeot appealed to "les bourgeois' seeking a reliable car with a good yet inconspicuous image. Demand for such cars exceeded Peugeot's capacity well into the 1960s. European drivers become Peugeot loyalists over years of use as they experienced their car's ex- ceptional comfort, road handling, and long-term reliability. So strong is this loyalty still that Peugeot rarely tries to prove a superiority with comparative statistics or at the time of purchase (with distinctive styling or luxury features). Peugeots win loyalty over years of ownership.
Is a long-term comparative advantage relevant in America's competitive market? Our survey of Peugeot owners confirmed what repeated market studies have told PMA. We received 31 responses to the question: What features of a Peugeot add value for you? Two-thirds of the features mentioned were ride and comfort (equally divided) with the next feature (20 percent) being long-term reliability.
A Comprehensive System for Follow-through
The comfort and reliability of Peugeots are real strengths but require a comprehensive system if Americans are to experience them over years of use. In France, where Peugeot had a strong demand and an extensive support system, it could once rely on engineering for comfort and handling and take following through on those features for granted. The situation is quite different in the U.S., where attention must shift to post-sale customer relations and service to keep customers driving their cars happily for years.
Building customer loyalty requires a comprehensive system of actions needed to keep customers happy over years of using their cars. This system will be built only if management follows through on advantages that satisfy people.
Product design. Comfort, secure driving, and reliability are wonderful. But they require design modifications as experience uncovers new challenges to customer satisfaction, such as rust problems and cold-weather stalling resulting from more extreme American weather. Making such modifications ensures that long-term satisfaction is not undermined by nagging nuisances.
Customer service. Recently, PMA has worked hard to build a network of authorized service centers that provide reliable service. So too has PMA corrected past problems in recently building a reputable system for delivering spare parts, liberally interpreting warranties, and training repair personnel.
Relationship building. Loyalty requires that consumers share a positive image of being a Peugeot owner, one that encourages them to identify themselves with the company and its fortunes in the United States. This identity must be recognized by the company with actions that testify that the company values this relationship. Communications to owners, awards, and company-sponsored events all contribute to the sense of relationship that can cut across generations of Peugeot drivers.
BUILDING A COOPERATIVE CULTURE WITH INTERNATIONAL ALLIES
Without a vision for how the U.S. was important to Peugeot as a corporation, and without a strategy or culture of cooperation with Americans, Peugeot's management was unable to justify a commitment to the United States. As long as Peugeot faced little competition for finely engineered cars, PMA could generate profits in some years. Once competitive cars were plentiful, though, Peugeot's sales collapsed.
Cooperating with International Allies
Three lessons about cooperation emerge from the Peugeot case. Each partner must (1) control its own agenda for cooperation, (2) take responsibility for its own success, and (3) make sure its allies profit from the alliance. Of these three principles, the last is the most important: Treat your allies as possessing competence and integrity and make sure they earn a profit, even if that means a loss for you! Any lesser position inspires your best allies to depart and encourages bitterness. The result of disappointing allies can be serious damage to a firm's public reputation, as shown by Jamie Kitman's (1993) emotional attack on Peugeot in the influential magazine Automobile.
A fundamental rule of cooperation is that when you advance no clear agenda, your allies will assume they should set the goals. Up to the mid-1980s, Peugeot's dealers responded to the company's lack of strategy with an array of proposed goals and policies concerning everything from advertising to warranties. With no agenda of its own, headquarters responded to these initiatives with silence, fueling an adversarial climate that publicly undermined confidence in the company, its management's integrity, and its cars.
Openness Is Based on Clarity of Identity
Peugeot entered the U.S. with fine automobiles, a proven ability to win customer loyalty, and talented dealers. All were a solid base for evolving a winning strategy and performance in the United States. However, this was only a base, and a host of adaptations were needed to develop cars and an organization for American competition. Awareness of the need for such adaptations and their detailed specification only arises from open give-and-take with allies and customers.
Open interaction between a company and others is never an easy process to manage. Nevertheless, adaptation must never be seen as a nuisance or an unwelcome infringement. Instead, global firms must welcome---even encourage-- interaction with customers and allies. Without adaptation, products and practices will not be equally effective in different cultures.
Promoting cross-cultural interaction is impossible without a clear sense of your own identity and a commitment to following through on that identity in a new culture. Peugeot knew and was proud of the fact that its cars were valued for their comfort and road handling. However, a myopic attribution of these properties to excellent engineering interfered---and still does--with grasping the fact that customers only appreciate these advantages over years of experience.(2) In other words, the knowledge of who you are must not only be from your own point of view but must also include the point of view of significant others.
CAN PEUGEOT RETURN?
Sources within Peugeot tell us that the company is now considering whether it should, return to the American market. There appears to be growing recognition that the United States is a reference market in the automobile industry. Peugeot executives speak of the U.S. market as "anticipating the rest of the world" an that no company can be "a respected global competitor without succeeding in the world's largest and most competitive auto market." As commendable as this stance is, Peugeot's consideration of a return must go beyond the issues of investment priorities within the company. Reconsideration must also face the continuing impact of both the firm's past performance and its decision to withdraw.
Is the American Market Forgiving?
Peugeot must not underestimate the fact that its past decisions and style have damaged its credibility. Customers, for example, describe the company as "fickle" and as having "taken money out of my pocket with an overnight drop in trade-in value when they withdrew." Nevertheless, only one-third of owners tell us they would not buy a Peugeot again. The majority express a willingness to forgive the company, with not a few noting that they would enjoy having the opportunity to consider a Peugeot again.
Loyalty based on past experience is nice, but our survey showed it to be insufficient. Trust is necessary. The most common response to a question about what the company would have to do to reestablish trust was that Peugeot would need to state unequivocally and prove through action that it "was now here to stay." In other words, Peugeot would need to have an evident commitment to the U.S. market. The most commonly mentioned way of demonstrating such a commitment would be in proving it had top dealers and an authorized service network to provide reliable and prompt service and parts. The final response on reestablishing trust was that the car Peugeot introduced would have to be a quality product by American standards and thus show an understanding of the American consumer and driving conditions.
A Need for Relationship Building
Which Peugeot car is best for the U.S. market? How can Peugeot locate Americans interested in comfort and handling in a European car? To which features of competitive cars must Peugeot conform to be respectable with this market segment? What services will these specific customers need to build loyalty over years of use? Such are the questions, along with many more like them, that Peugeot must answer as part of any effort to return to the market. And where can Peugeot get the answers? Certainly not in Paris!
The most knowledgeable and cooperative source of answers are les Peugeotistes--the people who have bought and treasured a Peugeot. But to win the trust of enthusiasts and obtain carefully thought-out responses, the company must build a relationship with them. It must convince them that it is serious about the American market, willing to adapt its products to legitimate feedback, and committed to ensuring value over the life of its cars. In short, it must establish a relationship with its loyalists as a valued part of the Peugeot family.
How many and at what locations are dealers and authorized service centers needed? What service training, parts availability, and payment policies are critical to providing Peugeot owners with responsive, high-value service? What warranty policies are needed to meet competitive standards and in which specifics is it most advantageous to exceed these standards? These too are questions Peugeot must address before it can return. Here too a relationship of trust and open interaction must be built. Not with consumers, whose legitimate concern is with car performance rather than system operation. The parties in this relationship are Peugeot's allies, its core dealers who worked most diligently in the past and remain dedicated to the value Peugeot provided to the American public.
Relationship building is more than information exchange. For Peugeot to establish trust, it will have to act on issues its enthusiasts raise about the Peugeots they are still driving. Our survey of owners indicates that investments of funds, talent, and policy revisions may well be needed in the competence and geographic depth of the company's service, promptness of meeting warranty expectations, prices on replacement parts, and trade-in value that was adversely affected by Peugeot's withdrawal. If the company is not committed to meeting such expectations of loyal owners, it would be best for it to limit its American experience to applying the lessons of the past to other markets. It is going to need those lessons in confronting the intensifying competition in Europe and the third world.
Peugeot managers must learn from their history. Simply putting a new car on the American market, no matter how excellent, will merely repeat the past failure. Before offering cars to American consumers, Peugeot must build a relationship with dealers, suppliers, and former customers and use that interaction to build a comprehensive system to guarantee satisfied driving for years. Peugeot will only then experience the success the company and its automobile so richly deserve.
Notes:
1. The minutes of the Peugeot dealers' council disclosed that cars to be shipped to the U.S. were produced by modifying an assembly line used to produce European models. Since the modification entailed a high setup cost, American cars were produced only twice a year during the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, cars delivered to the U.S. reflected market intelligence that could be six months out of date.
2. Peugeot executives have, with understandable pride, allowed us to examine market research documenting that comfort and road handling account for customer loyalty. At no time, however, has the discussion continued to how Peugeot can insure that customers achieve this loyalty. The propensity of Peugeot executives to stress product engineering is demonstrated in their concern that the company will reenter the U.S. with a product that excites their past customers (largely middle-aged consumers). This reaction demonstrates a narrowness in understanding the value of customer loyalty, for it is not only important what car past customers would buy but also what they would encourage others to buy. While Peugeot may find that its past owners are not the market for a sporty runabout, the children and younger associates of loyalists may well be a different story.
References
"Peugeot-Citroën Sales Top 1.5 Million in '77," Automotive News. March 20, 1978, p. 90.
M. Christopher, A. Payne, and D. Ballantyne, Relationship Marketing (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991).
R. Feast, "Peugeot's Fantastic Decade," Automotive News, December 22, 1980, pp. 10, 13.
P. Fridenson, "French Automobile Marketing," in Development of Mass Marketing: The Automobile and Retailing Industries, proceedings of the Fuji Conference, edited by A. Okochi and K. Shimokawa (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1981), pp. 127-154.
M.F. Grugeaux, "Dur, Dur! [Tough, Tough!]," LeJournal de l'Automobile, October 9, 1992, pp. 56, 58.
J.M. Hulbert and W.K. Brandt, Managing the Multinational Subsidiary (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1980).
Robert W. Irvin, "Peugeot Builds Slowly in U.S.," Automotive News, May 29, 1978, p. 3.
M. Keller, Collision: GM, Toyota, Volkswagen and the Race to Own the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday, 1993).
B.R. Kimes, The Star and the Laurel.. The Centennial History of Daimler, Mercedes and Benz (Montvale, NJ: Mercedes-Benz of North America, 1986).
J.L. King, "Peugeot's Approach to U.S. Cautious," Automotive News, August 30, 1982, p. 42.
J. Kitman, "Letter to Jacques Calvet," Automobile Magazine, February 1993, pp. 94-100.
J.M. Laux, The European Automobile Industry (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992).
J.M. Laux, In First Gear. The French Automobile Industry to 1914 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976).
"Peugeot 5058," Car and Driver; August 1980, pp. 65-69.
"Peugeot 604 SL," Motor Trend, May 1977, pp. 39-42.
"Peugeot 604 SLV-6," Road and Track, July 1977, pp. 125-128.
M. Resener, "Competing with Japan," Institutional Investor, July 1990, p. 43.
F.R. Root, Entry Strategies for International Markets (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987).
J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones, and D. Roos, The Machine That Changed The World (New York: Macmillan, 1990).
Jean-Loup Archawski is the president of M.C.D.S., a management consulting firm in Ardmore, Pennsylvania, as well as a board member and vice-president of the French-American Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Inc. (Philadelphia chapter). Francis W. Wolek is a professor of management at Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania.
COPYRIGHT 1995 JAI Press, Inc.
